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INTRODUCTION
People are lazy. With television you just sit-watch-listen. The
thinking is done for you.'
-Roger Ailes, Former Communications Advisor to President Nixon
A memo by Roger Ailes, recently unearthed at the Richard Nixon
Presidential Library, proposed a method of using centralized media to
affect policymaking on a mass scale.2 With enough fiscal resources,
actors outside of the government structure could influence decision-
making by exploiting the relative costs of democracy' to manipulate
local voices.'
* Symposium Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Juris Doctor Candidate 2014,
University of Miami School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Chemistry and History, Wake Forest
University. A special thank you to Professor Charlton C. Copeland for three years of dedicated
mentorship. I also thank Isaac Duerr for his guidance and edits. Most of all, I must express my
eternal gratitude to my parents and Pratima Raju for their endless patience and years of support.
1. Memorandum for the President From Roger Ailes: A Plan for Putting the GOP on TV
News, available at http://edge-cache.gawker.com/gawker/ailesfiles/ailesl.html.
2. Ailes would eventually attempt to execute this vision in founding Fox News. See Tom
Junod, Why Does Roger Ailes Hate America, ESQUIRE (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.esquire.com/
features/roger-ailes-0211 (profiling how Roger Ailes changed political media in America).
3. Economists propose that the high cost of becoming an informed voter weighed against the
low chance of casting the deciding vote lead to a "rational ignorance" among individual voters.
See ANTHONY DowNs, AN EcoNoMIc THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 244-46 (1957).
4. Adam Clark Estes, Report: Roger Ailes Started Planning Fox News While Working for
Nixon, THE WIRE (June 30, 2011), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2011/06/roger-ailes-nixon-
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Today, the influence of groups with minority views seeking mean-
ingful participation in democratic decision-making remains muscular but
unbalanced. While theories of federalism attempt to describe methods to
protect these dissenters, in practice, there is little affordable recourse for
individuals without substantial means. High costs and risks associated
with physical relocation can make the option prohibitive, so citizens
frustrated with policy must try to turn around disfavorable policies from
within.
In recent years, progressives have begun to shake off aversion to
federalism and warm to new functionalist adaptations. Progressive fed-
eralism' seeks to expand on the traditional outlets for vocalizing discon-
tent. The idea moves democracy beyond the ballot box and open debate
in the public square by reimagining the government-citizen relation-
ship.6 It rethinks the space in which we govern by breaking down the
formal wall of "sovereignty"' from the federal government, all the way
down to sub-local specialized units of governance. This flexible space
recognizes an interdependence inherent in the shared and limited
resources of government that empowers citizen administrators with a
rougher and organic variant of voice-disloyalty. This permits commu-
nities to exercise minority-rule and push back on normative policy direc-
tives from above by challenging their marching orders below.' What
results is greater competition of ideas in free market politics.
But this theory is incomplete. It describes a two-dimensional sys-
tem of checks and balances in horizontal and vertical governance where
officials are in a perpetual battle for policymaking influence. While it
empowers the voices of the minority, it fails to consider the relative
costs of different manifestations of voice and is naive to how money
gawker-documents/39469/ (detailing the release of documents demonstrating Roger Ailes' idea to
use political pressure via the media to reshape the power of governance and strengthen the
executive branch under the Nixon Administration).
5. See Leon Neyfakh, How to Fix America From Below, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 7, 2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/10/06/heather-gerken-how-fix-america-from-below/KZ
MC5AYrBBWSgwOjMESc5M/story.html (profiling Heather Gerken and her work on federalism
all the way down); Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACYJOURNAL.ORG
(Spring 2012), http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=all
(promoting a new model of centralization that allows minorities to rule and produce a healthier
democracy at large).
6. Citizens are heavily involved as "servants," tasked with administering and implementing
the policies multiple governments. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARv. L. REv. 4, 8 (2010) ("[S]ervants exercise a muscular form of 'voice,' as they can set
policy rather than merely complain about it.").
7. See id. at 12.
8. Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DuKE L.J. 1349, 1349 (2013).
9. Gerken, supra note 6 ("[M]inority-rule is contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by
the national majority; and rebellious decisions can originate even from banally administrative
units.").
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ultimately comes to dominate free speech.1 o Minority views imagined in
progressive federalism remain dependent on their shared geography for
influence, as without support from peers, disloyal actors are merely
"lone wolves" who can be replaced. They compete with government'"
and private organizations1 2 seeking to influence policymaking below
that can flex their muscles using a deluge of cash. In this battle of money
versus action, the relative costs for monied "outsiders" are compara-
tively small. For this reason, progressive federalism ultimately fails in
its goal of minority inclusion because it perpetuates economic
inequality.
In this Note, Section I will briefly summarize the traditional voice
and exit methods of feedback used by citizens in our democracy to sig-
nal dissatisfaction with state policy. Section II will describe the role of
minority feedback in formal and functional theories of federalism, and
highlight the benefits of reimagining power as decentralized in the the-
ory of progressive federalism. These descriptions will highlight the fail-
ures of the sovereignty approach and explain how decentralization
empowers minority voices as a practical matter.
In Section III, I will argue that progressive federalism is an incom-
plete model that leads to economic inequality. This claim is rooted in the
Supreme Court's recognition of political money as free speech that com-
petes with other forms of voice.1 3 I will discuss how private organiza-
tions of "outsiders" engage in policymaking using money as speech to
the detriment of minority voices without fiscal resources and how this
intrusion's perversion is similar to governmental distortion of policy
through block grants. Section III will close with an egregious case study
that illustrates the vulnerability of minority rule under progressive feder-
alism. Finally, Section IV will provide suggestions to extend the decen-
tralized model of progressive federalism. The Internet has allowed us to
break down geographic dependence. I will explore how this technology
10. See Jeremy W. Peters, 73,000 Political Ads Test Even a City of Excess, N.Y. THAms (Oct.
16, 2012), at Al (highlighting the discontent in the citizenry of Las Vegas as the most saturated
political media market during the 2012 election cycle).
11. See Maurice R. Dyson, Are We Really Racing to the Top or Leaving Behind the Bottom?
Challenging Conventional Wisdom and Dismantling Institutional Repression, 40 Wash. U. J. L. &
POL'Y 181 (2012).
12. See Frontline: Big Sky Big Money (PBS television broadcast Oct. 30, 2012) (chronicling
how IE Western Tradition Partnership in Montana and Colorado acquire candidate signatures and
highly personal information about the candidates in order to send out mass mailings and letters
under the candidates name); see also Kim Barker et al., Dcouments Found in Meth House Bare
Inner Workings of Dark Money Group, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/29/westem-tradition-partnership-n_-2038210.html.
13. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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offers a platform to lower the relative cost of participation through voice
and revitalizes the potential for exit.
While progressive federalism purports to enhance minority partici-
pation, its decentralized approach exacerbates economic inequality.
Minority groups using fiscal resources as free speech come to dominate
the voices of minorities who use non-monetary means to participate in
policymaking. There may be ways to manage the relative costs of partic-
ipation using new technology. Only by controlling these costs can we
stem the tide of economic inequality that threatens to become the hall-
mark of the twenty-first century. 14
I. SIGNALING DISCONTENT TO POLICYMAKERS
Legal scholars readily turn to economist Albert 0. Hirschman's
theory on methods of response to decline in firms and states" when
discussing the intersection of our democracy and federalism. His work
finds that individuals dissatisfied with state governance can provide
feedback to induce state action toward improvement through one of two
means: voice or exit.16 This model describes voice as any attempt to turn
around a problematic situation and exit as any attempt to escape the
problem entirely."
Our system of democracy provides multiple avenues to voice dis-
content. Citizens are afforded a direct procedural or structural opportu-
nity' to have a say in decision-making at the ballot box. This procedural
opportunity for feedback sometimes presents itself directly, like in the
case of direct referenda, but it more frequently appears in the periodic
election of proxies in governance. Put bluntly, "[i]f the public disap-
proves of government policy, they can vote to 'throw the bastards' out
and elect a new set of bastards who will, hopefully, do better."19
These procedural channels for voice are complemented by another
avenue made possible by the substantive guarantees of the First Amend-
ment.2 0 Free speech and protest allow dissenters to take to the public
14. Ian Talley, IMF Warns Inequality Is a Drag on Growth, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304185104579437193433238018;
Eduardo Porter, A Relentless Widening in the Disparity of Wealth, N.Y. TiMEs (Mar. 12, 2014), at
Bl.
15. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
16. Id. at 5.
17. K. Dowding et al., The Exit of Residential Mobility or the Voice of Political Action?
Strategies for Problem Solving in Residential Communities, 33 JouRNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
321, 338 (2003).
18. Gerken, supra note 8.
19. Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom 3 (Nov. 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2160388.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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square to communicate dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs
and seek to convince fellow citizens that something is wrong with the
status quo. This exercise of voice may arise in forms ranging from
orderly debate, to defiant demonstrations. 2 1 Hirschman's observation of
protests at Kent State during the Vietnam War shaped his belief that the
power of this form of feedback was greatly underappreciated by econo-
mists and scholars.2 2 A recent wave of protests resulting in government
and policy changes throughout the rest of the world should only serve to
strengthen this view.23
Feedback from exit provides an alternative to voice. Dissatisfied
constituents can choose to "vote with their feet"2 4 and move away. Less
drastically, they can utilize private ordering to achieve an exit remedy,
like enrolling their children in an independent school or relocating to a
neighborhood within a homeowners association.2 5 Ideally, exit achieves
dual goals of signaling to authorities that their performance is unaccept-
able while improving the lives of exiting citizens. 26 However, a citizen
must have access to a market of distinct choices for exit to have any
meaning, which explains why its staunchest proponents tend to concep-
tualize our community borders as formal guarantees of policymaking
independence.27
II. VOICE, EXIT, AND FEDERALISM
By design, our system of federalism seeks to maximize political
21. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a statute prohibiting flag
burning).
22. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of
Recent Contributions, 13 Soc. SC. INFO. 7, 7-26 (1974), reprinted in 58 MILBANK MEM'L FUND
Q. HEALTH & Soc'y 430, 430-56 (1980).
23. Voice's newest manifestation, social media, has provided a catalyst and device for global
protests against injustice worldwide. Certain governments have come to fear its use and have
pushed for bans that are easily circumvented. Terrance McCoy, Turkey Bans Twitter-and Twitter
Explodes, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/03/21/turkey-bans-twitter-and-twitter-explodes/; see also Marie-Louise Gumuchian
and Laura Smith-Spark, Arab Spring Three Years On: Unsettled Waters or a Turning Tide, CNN
(Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.con2014/03/14/world/meast/arab-spring-three-years/; Lorenzo
Franceschi-Bicchierai, In Venezuela, the Only Free Media is Twitter, MASHABLE (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/02/28/venezuela-twitter/; Nick Robins-Early, Ukraine Twitter Photos
Show Brutal Aftermath of Kiev Clashes, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/20/ukraine-twitter-photos-kiev-clashesn _4823693.html; The March
of Protest, THE EcONOMIST (June 29, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21580143-
wave-anger-sweeping-cities-world-politicians-beware-march-protest/.
24. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416
(1956).
25. Somin, supra note 19, at 30-34.
26. HmscHmAN, supra note 15, at 15-16.
27. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55-WTR LAW &
CorrEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992); see also Somin, supra note 19.
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freedom of its citizens by affording the minority certain rights of partici-
pation. Academics and jurists argue over how to depict its structure to
ensure the effectiveness of voice and exit feedback.2 8 Originalists find
guidance in the writings of the founders,2 9 envisioning state borders as
rigid demarcations of independent "sovereign bubbles," designed to
maximize the impact of exit for frustrated citizens. They can point to the
"original exit""o that gave birth to the nation and romanticize the expan-
sion west that gave birth to protective minority enclaves like Utah."
Functionalists dismiss this formalism and the relative effectiveness of
exit in the modem era, urging the adoption of a more fluid conception of
power in our federalism to boost the impact of voice.
A. Formalism's Feedback Failure
The seduction of formalism is its apparent ability to turn the art of
untangling the web of government into a science through "deductive rea-
soning," but this simplification occurs at the peril of the welfare of
democracy.3 2 While formalists often turn to the Tenth Amendment" in a
reflexive appeal to sovereignty,34 the dirty secret is that there is little
actual guidance in the text of the Constitution to support this kind of
formalism," which scholars argue leads to notorious unpredictability. In
practice, this approach fails in its goals of maximizing political freedoms
and protecting those with minority views. These dissenters can find
themselves trapped in a sovereign state by high exit costs and deprived
of any meaningful exercise of voice by its plenary powers. Their sole
protection is the limited safety net of individual rights as interpreted by
Supreme Court precedent.
Instead, the Supreme Court tersely implies that state sovereignty is
28. Gerken, supra note 8 ("[M]uch of constitutional theory is preoccupied with a single
question: What does a democracy owe its minorities?").
29. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) ("Each State, in ratifying the
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by
its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a Federal,
and not a National constitution.").
30. Notably, individuals choosing to escape religious oppression set the standard in their
pilgrimage to Plymouth Plantation. WLLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION (1651).
Years later, the American Revolution would mark a more collective exercise of exit, albeit at a
tremendous cost.
31. See Somin, supra note 19, at 27.
32. Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST.
U.L. REv. 959 (1997).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
34. Black's Law Dictionary's pertinent definition of sovereignty is "the supreme political
authority of an independent state." BLACK'S LAW DicTiONARY (9th ed. 2009).
35. Chermerinsky, supra note 32 ("A key problem with formalistic limits based on federalism
has been their arbitrariness and the inability of the Court to identify principles that could be
applied in future cases."); see also Epstein, supra note 27, at 149.
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an absolute,3 6 issuing opinions that read like invitations for states to nul-
lify federal laws on an at-will basis:
[W]e look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting "the
simple expedient of not yielding" to federal blandishments when they
do not want to embrace the federal policies as their own. The States
are separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act
like it.3 7
The Court's recent depiction of the states as victims of federal "coer-
cion"38 by means of "a gun to the head"39 might lead one to conclude it
is serious about preserving sovereignty and the integrity of exit. How-
ever, the Court's willingness to selectively strike down state and local
laws emerging from the free market of minority community political
voices4 0 has occasionally rendered the results of voice and possibility of
exit meaningless in one fell swoop with an unpredictability that hurts
policymaking. Instead, the Court's emphasis on sovereignty must be
read as an expansive catchall (or perhaps a metaphor)4 1 for individual
liberty to fill perceived holes in the Bill of Rights.4 2
Formal federalism's purported rigid boundaries have the effect of
ballooning power at the state level.4 3 Its proponents fetishize exit for
those who disagree with statewide policies. But a major difficulty lies in
36. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) ("No matter how powerful the
federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require
the States to regulate.").
37. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (emphasis added)
(striking down an expansion of Medicaid providing substantial additional funding to the states in
exchange for covering the uninsured).
38. Id. at 2604; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); see also Charlton C.
Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and
the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 160-63 (2012) (discussing the Court's
decision to turn the doctrine of coercion from a theoretical possibility into reality without a stable
framework).
39. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
40. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3021 (2010); but see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a state statute
invidiously targeting homosexuals).
41. The recent impartation of human qualities to states is a shift from former imagery
accusing the federal government of "imposing on" or "commandeering" the state through
coercion. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
42. The argument over federalism may be a manifestation of a proxy debate between the
ideologies of utilitarianism and individualism.
43. Nestor M. Davidson, Vertical Learning: On Baker and Rodriguez's Constitutional Home
Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENv. U.L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009) ("In one view of vertical
federalism, the federal government is understood as constrained to enumerated powers, states
retain plenary policy power, and local governments are traditionally creatures of the state. This
view yields something of structural constitutional bell curve that situates the heart of sovereignty
at the state level, leaving the federal government and local governments with forms of limited
authority on either end.").
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the fact that exit is "bare" due to information asymmetry between the
officials and the citizenry, which means elected leaders may never real-
ize the consequences of specific policy choices, where voice would pro-
vide a much richer form of feedback."
Reliance on exit as a tenable democratic channel for feedback
requires a naive approach that severely discounts the costs of departure
in both the corporate and personal context. For most small businesses,
the scale of their enterprise often means that livelihood depends on rela-
tionships in the community, so the net costs of physically relocating,
cultivating new clients, and researching a new destination for favorable
business conditions can be prohibitive.4 5 Small businesses are more
likely to close their doors in unfavorable conditions than to engage in
this incalculable risk.46 From the opposite perspective, states targeting
business prospects utilize their sovereignty to engage in a race to the
bottom through legislative carve outs and executive-ordered administra-
tive exemptions.4 Larger corporations may benefit by capturing the ear
of multiple state governments and threatening to exit, but this often trig-
gers feuds between state executives, who actively attempt to interfere
with the commerce of other states to benefit their own.48 Governors hag-
gle over tailor-made breaks to seduce companies behind closed doors,
and when a deal is struck, a move from one state to another can result in
the devastation of a state's commerce49 and the sudden unemployment
of entire sectors of workers.
Individuals considering exit fare even worse. The fiscal costs of
researching a new community, finding a new source of income, and
moving to a new home are compounded by immeasurable emotional
costs of leaving friends and family behind. A phenomenon known as
44. Hirschman, supra note 22, at 437.
45. Perhaps in the field of E-Commerce we can carve out an exception.
46. See Mildred Warner & Lingwen Zheng, Business Incentive Adoption in the Recession, 27
EcoN. DEV. Q. 90 (2013) (noting that studies on results from local incentives to attract small
businesses were inconclusive); Jinah Ahn, Small Business Check-Up: Time to Close Your
Business?, NoLo, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/business-closing-check-up-36240.
html.
47. See, e.g., Steven Dornfeld, New Tax Bill Laced with Special Tax Breaks for Selected
Businesses, MINN. POST (May 28, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/05/new-
tax-bill-laced-special-tax-breaks-selected-businesses.
48. Steve Bousquet, Gov. Scott's Efforts to Raid Out-of-State Jobs Ticks Off Governors,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jun. 7, 2013), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/gov-scotts-efforts-to-
raid-out-of-state-jobs-ticks-off-other-governors/2125420.
49. Jacob Dirr, Source: NCR to Move Headquarters, 1,300 Jobs to Georgia, DAYTON Bus. J.
(Jun. 1, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/stories/2009/06/01/dailyl5.html (revealing that
backdoor negotiations had resulted in the largest employer in Dayton being seduced to move out
of state); Josh Sanburn, Why is Texas Governor Rick Perry in Illinois?, TIME (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/04/24/why-is-texas-governor-rick-perry-in-illinois/.
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"exit fatigue""o usually prevents the individual from risking a second
move if unfavorable state policies are adopted subsequent to relocation,
or if the individual has misjudged what the state has to offer.5 ' Studies
have shown that exit is a privilege afforded to those who are less depen-
dent on the community services, which hurts poorer minorities who may
be limited in their choice of communities.52 Perhaps the most sinister
possibility implicit in absolute state sovereignty is the potential for a
government to induce exit of groups of disfavored individuals5 3 and
businesses5 4 when the Supreme Court determines the class falls outside
the protections of the Bill of Rights.
B. The Federalism Evolution
Progressives warming to the notion of federalism" seek to trans-
form the formalist approach in a way analogous to the evolution of hori-
zontal interaction between the federal branches.5 7 In that context, the
strict normative division of power between the federal branches has
50. Hirschman, supra note 22, at 449.
51. Hirschman further suggests that an inflated sense of loyalty to the new location often
results from the costs of migration, which can contribute to the unwillingness to risk a second exit.
Id.
52. One survey conducted in Columbus, Ohio found that blacks who lacked the mobility of
whites were more likely to stay and express their discontent-this was not simply because of the
fiscal mobility costs, but the lack of mobility caused by the constraints of de facto segregation.
John Orbell & Toru Uno, A Theory of Neighborhood Problem Solving: Political Action vs.
Residential Mobility, 66 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 471, 484 (1972).
53. Arizona has gained notoriety in its open attempts to induce "voluntary deportation" for
non-citizens and legislation targeting gay and lesbian citizens. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2010); Hadia Hakim, Support for Arizona-Style Inmigration Bills Spreads During
Gubernatorial Elections Despite U.S. v. Arizona Ruling, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 237, 241 (2010);
Ann Morse, Arizona's Immigration Enforcement Laws Introduction, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=20263 (last visited Oct. 8, 2010); see also Sean
Sullivan, With Gay Discrimination Bill, Arizona Gov. Brewer Again Finds Self at Center of
Standoff WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-gay-
discrimination-bill-arizona-gov-brewer-again-finds-self-at-center-of-standoff/2014/02/27/d727bf
Oe-9fef- 1l e3-aO5-dc3322a94fa7 story.html/.
54. Businesses that provide certain reproductive health services are the most obvious example
of targets for exit. Adam Liptak, Justices Reject Bid to Block Texas Law on Abortions, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 20, 2013), at A13.
55. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) ("Precedent aside, however, respondent
would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did, a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do."), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
56. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 567, 569 (2011)
("Federalism under the Obama Administration is federalism in service of progressive policy, not a
general devolution of power and resources to the states.").
57. Gerken, supra note 6, at 8 ("We don't even have a name for its alternative, let alone a
fully theorized cognate to the checks and balances approach."); see also Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1071 ("Once we explicitly recognize
that laissez-faire capitalism was legitimately repudiated by a process of structural amendment
2014] 861
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thawed over time in favor of a "checks and balances"" approach. This
theory of horizontal power establishes "multiple heads of authority in
government" and pits them against one another in a continuous struggle
to prevent the consolidation of power while allowing the government as
a whole to carry forward their mutual interests. 59 If this game of tug-of-
war explains an inclusive method of effective horizontal governance,
can it be applied to the vertical distribution of power?60
In practice, there is more flexibility in the relationship between
states and the federal government. The process 61 used in decision-mak-
ing carries a greater weight than formal divisions in establishing legiti-
macy, and the courts are generally reluctant to police the boundaries of
power. Our state and federal governments routinely work together to
fund and administer complicated and pragmatic solutions to big
problems 62 without the concern of confusing the electorate that has justi-
fied selective Supreme Court interference in recent years.6 3 The federal
government has thrust itself into the administration of state election law
through oversight when there is a compelling interest.6 4 It has taken an
even more direct role in state-run healthcare exchanges under the
culminating in the 1930s, we are no longer obliged to save the welfare state at the cost of
trivializing the process of legal interpretation.").
58. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction
with those of Congress."); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 251-52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 2003) ("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that
such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government."); but see N. Pipeline
Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (striking down the jurisdiction of a
legislatively created bankruptcy court under formalist principles).
59. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578 (1984).
60. A theory of vertical checks and balances is not wholly irreconcilable with recent Supreme
Court precedent. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) ("The
independent power of the States also serves as a check on the power of the Federal
Government.").
61. Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of Process Federalism, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 175 (1994).
62. We see this routinely with health services, emergency FEMA relief, transportation
projects, and education programs.
63. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) ("Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.").
64. The Supreme Court recently struck down part of the Voters Rights Act. PUB. L. No. 102-
166, 105 STAT. 1101 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 16, 29 & 42 U.S.C.);
Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627-28 (2013) ("Racial disparity in those
numbers was compelling evidence justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage
formula . . . . There is no longer such a disparity.").
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Affordable Care Act,65 issuing substantive policy mandates on the rec-
ognition of same-sex marriages on the exchange and strongly encourag-
ing states to recognize same-sex couples in the context of Medicaid. 6 6
And in the courts below, federal district court judges serve as mediators
between "sovereigns" as members of both communities, empowered to
"check" state laws that unbalance shared power.67
The relationship between federal and state governments is more
give-and-take, as states can flex their muscles and assert autonomy
through influence in the federal political process or tweak the implemen-
tation or effect of federal law through state statute or cooperation with
the administrative state. 68 Many new theories of federalism 69 attempt to
describe this symbiotic matrimony between state and federal govern-
ment; they are admittedly an improvement on formalism but share com-
mon weaknesses. First, weakening sovereignty among the states leads to
greater uniformity that undermines the effectiveness of exit. Second, the
relative weakness of local governments compared to the "quasi-sover-
eign"7o state continues to minimize the importance of minority voices
allowing plenary authority to override dissenter participation.
Concentration of power in the hands of the state allows plenary
intrusions at the local level when a state majority disfavors policy or
populations. The problem stems from the fact that municipalities are
legally recognized as creations of the state that are inherently destructi-
ble at will.71 Should states be allowed to dismantle cities just because
65. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Affordable Care Act"), PUB. L. No. 111-
148, 124 STAT. 119 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66. CMS Issues Guidance Concerning Same-Sex Marriages, HEALTHREFORMGPS (Oct.
1, 2013), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/cms-issues-guidance-conceming-same-sex-
marriages/.
67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Similar checks occur when federal judges invalidate local
policies that violate individual rights. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 739 F. Supp. 2d 376
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (striking down New York's controversial Stop-and-Frisk policy).
68. Medicaid expansion and bankruptcy applications of state exemptions are two obvious
examples. See, e.g., Samantha Artiga, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & The Uninsured, The Role of
Section 1115 Waivers in Medicaid and Chip: Looking Forward and Looking Back 5 (2009),
available at http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/Waiver%20RenewalThe%2Role%
C20of%C20Section%C201118%?aiversMar2009.pdf (discussing different waiver programs
under Medicaid); see also Gerken, supra note 6, at 8-9.
69. "Put simply, cooperative federalism involves the sharing of authority between federal and
state agencies, often leaving state agencies with discretion to implement broad federal policy
goals, binding criteria, or guidelines." Phillip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its
Challenges, 2003 DET. C.L. MIcH. ST. U. L. REv. 727, 728-729 (2003); see also Philip J. Weiser,
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663 (2001).
70. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 227, 230 (1996).
71. See generally Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (allowing the state
legislature to pass a bill dissolving and merging two cities against the will of local constituents);
see also Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972) (deciding a municipality
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they are not protected by home-rule7 2 in the state constitution? Imagine
if the legislature of Texas voted to dissolve Houston, the fourth largest
city in the United States." Localists defiantly call for municipal sover-
eignty74 as a parallel solution to federalism, but this pushes the problems
of formalism down to intra-municipal communities. 5 Progressive feder-
alist theorists take a different approach, having seen the merit in the
diffusion of power. Its advocates have taken decentralization a step fur-
ther, abandoning the sacrosanct idea of sovereignty altogether in favor
of a free-market democracy where dissenters can exert more influence
from the bottom up.7 6
C. Free Market Political Discourse: The Theory of
Progressive Federalism
By shedding the rigid constraints of sovereignty, progressive feder-
alism strengthens the potential power of voice and exit for dissenters and
their communities. The vertical system of checks and balances comple-
ments the horizontal, resulting in a squishy conception of power that
flows in two dimensions. Eliminating sovereignty enables dissention
through participation by imagining vertical power as intricately con-
nected along a continuum,78 from the federal government at the very top,
all the way down past the smallest special purpose sub-local institutions,
where individual citizens administer policy. 79 This decentralization of
has only such powers as the legislature confers upon it). Dillon's Rule, observed by many state
courts, traditionally has treated the powers of municipalities as extremely limited. DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 237 (5th ed. 1911) ("[A] municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable.").
72. States can take affirmative steps to protect municipalities from their own intrusion
through home rule. See, e.g., FLA .CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (providing substantial freedom to counties
pursuant to home rule).
73. Admittedly, Houston is protected by Home-Rule. Houston, (city) Texas, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4835000.html.
74. Gerken, supra note 6, at 23-28.
75. For a look at what selective local sovereignty can do to minority communities, see D.
MARVIN JONES, FEAR OF A HIP-Hop PLANET: AMERICA'S NEW DILEMMA (2013).
76. Gerken, supra note 6, at 23-28.
77. See id. at 8.
78. This has in part been forged by the increased symbiotic relationship between all levels of
government. States depend deeply on block grants and federal monies for their survival, just as the
federal government depends on the state governments to administer these programs.
79. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) ("Because the
police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of
governing that touch on citizens' daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments
closer to the governed."); Gerken, supra note 6, at 27 ("Even substate and sublocal institutions
that possess considerable direction are understood to be administrative units of the state . . . .
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power allows us to envision groups with minority views or interests
challenging policy directives through their role in administration by
demonstrating their disloyalty to the system. 0
Empowerment through disloyalty is a "more muscular variant" of
voice," which provides a direct opportunity to citizens from their role in
civic administration and participation. As "insiders," the strength of
voice goes beyond voting or protest-it is buoyed by "the power to
act-the ability to tweak, adjust, even resist federal policy" because of
the interdependence inherent in government administration.8 2 In this
way, progressive federalism assumes that dissenting communities and
voices improve and increase the debate and discussion in our policymak-
ing by giving minority views a platform.8 3
Heather Gerken, perhaps the most avid proponent of progressive
federalism, points to recent policy successes that can be better explained
by this paradigm.84 In California, community pressures on the San Fran-
cisco Mayor led him to order the issuance of marriage certificates to
same-sex couples in violation of state law, unleashing a surge of debate,
education, and eventual support for same-sex marriage.85 Lower-profile
county clerks throughout the country have followed suit, defiantly using
their administrative positions to test state bans by issuing marriage cer-
tificates to same-sex couples.86 Jury nullification in places like Colo-
rado affords an opportunity for dissenters to use voice in preventing the
These institutions can be quite powerful, but the power they wield is not their own . . . . Special
purpose institutions, in short, provide minorities with a chance to exercise voice inside the system,
not to set policy outside it.").
80. Gerken, supra note 8.
81. Gerken, supra note 6, at 14.
82. Id. at 46.
83. Gerken describes the struggle as "the democratic chum necessary for an ossified national
system to move forward." Id. at 10. See also Richard Florida, The Economic Geography of Talent,
92 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 743 (2002) (arguing that minority groups and economic
diversity drive innovation and creativity in urban areas in business and government).
84. See Gerken, supra note 6, at 41-43.
85. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 183 P.3d 384 (2008); Gerken, supra note 6, at 62
("Consider, for instance, how different San Francisco's efforts to marry same-sex couples looked
from the bread and butter activities of other proponents of gay marriage. The city made the case
for same-sex marriage in a way that abstract debate could never achieve. Beamed into all of our
television sets were pictures of happy families that looked utterly conventional save for the
presence of two tuxedos or two wedding dresses.").
86. Mark Scolforo, Pennsylvania Judge Orders Clerk To Stop Issuing Gay Marriage
Licenses, HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/12/pennsyl
vania-judge-gay-marriage_n 3914587.html.
87. The doctrine of jury nullification is based on community dissent where juries can push
back on the law through refusal to observe it. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677 (1995) (arguing that jury
nullification allows African-Americans to decide when African-Americans should be punished in
the larger system of justice).
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enforcement of federal laws on marijuana that are incongruous with
community views. More generally, Gerken envisions PTA members,
state bureaucrats, local prosecutors," and police officers empowered by
their positions as participants to vocalize dissent through delay or modi-
fication of policy directives in order to push back on the normative
"center." 89 If they can gain support, perhaps they can convince others to
use their voices too. What decentralization catalyzes is a vigorous mar-
ketplace of ideas to foster public debate between minority groups.90
The tug-of-war between smaller and smaller units unbound from
sovereignty may also revitalize the potential usefulness of exit by pro-
moting natural free-market variance driven by community standards. 91
This effectively lowers the cost of "foot voting" in a number of ways.
First, more ideas in practice mean more selection for the citizen/con-
sumer, a concept directly stemming from the bolstering of the market-
place of ideas.92 Second, access to meaningful choices moves closer to
home, decreasing the cost of physically moving if a state gives commu-
nities more autonomy. Third, the availability of choice promotes a
greater flexibility in selection, allowing citizens to maintain the benefits
of policies they agree with while leaving the ones they dislike across
town. Finally, this free-market administrative approach paves the way
for more choice through private ordering and non-government alterna-
tives, 93 as diffusion of power allows greater penetration.
But these non-government organizations play a much greater role
than providing an exit to hold officials accountable. Exogenous organi-
zations can exercise voice to exert pressure on the system of governance.
Left unchecked, private organizations can have a great impact on the
delicate system of checks and balances along the vertical and horizontal
planes of power. Progressive federalism's failure to explore monied
voices outside of government leaves a gaping hole in the paradigm.
These non-government organizations often check and balance them-
selves using their voices to push on policy debate.
88. These actors use their powers to re-interpret law before enforcing it. A good example is
prosecutorial discretion on the enforcement of marijuana laws in Washington State, which is still a
violation of federal law. Judd Legum, After Passage of Legalization Initiative, 220 Marijuana
Cases Dismissed in Washington State, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 10, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/
justice/2012/11/10/1176151/after-passage-of-legalization-initiative-220-marijuana-cases-
dismissed-in-washington-state/.
89. See Gerken, supra note 6, at 8-9.
90. Id. at 61-62.
91. See Somin, supra note 19.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 30.
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Ill. WHY PROGRESSIVE FEDERALISM IS INCOMPLETE
Progressive federalism's primary failure is an economic one.
Through decentralization, the theory purports to allow "local dissenters
to join together and put policies into place." 94 From this minority rule, it
hopes to provide opportunities to exercise voice in policymaking to fos-
ter political and economic participation. However, this "laissez-faire"
approach to decision-making ignores the relative cost of the several
forms of voice and ultimately perpetuates economic inequality. This
results in a disparity between groups of dissenters-who require a cer-
tain degree of cohesion-in their attempts at consensus building, else
their ideas fizzle and die. Such market failure can lead to a dispropor-
tionate influence in policymaking.
A. The Measure of Voice
Albert 0. Hirschman conceded that part of the reason that voice
was a challenging concept for economists was the inherent difficulty in
evaluating it with metrics.9 5 While exit allows us to take a head count to
see how many supporters are left standing in our camp, voice has an
illusory quality in the way it exerts pressure in the tangled web of gov-
ernance.9 6 Our democratic avenues for expressing disapproval of policy
through voice-elections, freedom of speech, and civic participation in
administration-each come at a price. It is easier to count the fiscal
costs, where putting a dollar value on time, reputation, and risk makes
analysis difficult.
Taking the pulse of each of these outlets is obscured by other fac-
tors. Hirschman posits that many who sit on the sidelines quietly do not
do so from apathy and may share the sentiments of those already voicing
displeasure, but the relative cost of participation trumps the benefits of
jumping in and bolstering the presence and power of like-minded citi-
zens." While the nation has trended in the direction of meaningful9 8 and
increased participation" in the democratic process, the planned and peri-
94. Gerken, supra note 5, at 43.
95. In the context of the firm, we can measure the number of respondent's willing to review
the product, but this is not available with the state. See Hirschman, supra note 22, at 431.
96. Hirschman, supra note 22, at 433.
97. Id. at 432-33. This might also explain Richard Nixon's appeal to the "silent majority" in
his election.
98. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. Amend. XVII (requiring the direct election of United States
Senators by a popular vote); U.S. CONST. Amend. XXIV (eliminating poll taxes); Eric Lipton &
Ian Urbina, In Five Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 12, 2007), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html (discussing a Department of Justice
investigation under President George W. Bush turning up virtually no evidence of organized voter
fraud in federal elections).
99. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting female suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XV
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odic nature of elections is not an organic snapshot. Voters may harbor
strong or weak feelings about their choice, and they may or may not be
casting their vote based on information." It is even harder to quantify
the impact and costs of dissent through administrative participation and
noncommercial free speech, but common sense tells us that an individ-
ual's resources of time and reputation are generally not unlimited. We
know that a disloyal administrator's power comes from his ability to
convince others to join him, which makes his influence dependent on
grassroots geographic support. But how do these grassroots resources
stack up against fiscal resources?
Money and free speech share an awkward equivalencyo' in an era
where the rights to associate and assemble have been scaled back.10 2
Because political money has been interpreted as a manifestation of
voice, it joins the list of feedback mechanisms to provide guidance to
government. Political money is given to candidates or issue groups to
pay for the costs of lobbying and advertising. Unlike the human capital
expended in other forms of voice, money is measurable, fungible, and
not path dependent. The result is a commoditized version of voice that
meshes poorly with a paradigm where minority political power is sup-
posed to originate in organic clusters of dissenters.
B. Money Talks
Progressive federalism is incomplete because it pits minority
groups whose strength comes from their physical proximity against
those who can intrude with cold hard cash. The Supreme Court has pri-
oritized monetary speech over the rights to associate and assemble,10 3
which hampers the exposure of non-monied minority groups seeking to
build support from the bottom-up. Organized money can flow from non-
governmental exogenous private entities or from within the government
itself in order to shape policy. The fungible nature of money means that
(granting suffrage to persons of all race); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (enfranchising adults over
the age of 18).
100. Proponents of exit tend to point to the futility of elections for the individual. They believe
that the unlikelihood of casting the deciding vote disincentives a well-researched decision,
breeding a "rational ignorance" and reducing elections to a sport between "political fans." See
Somin, supra note 19, at 7-9.
101. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("[R]estriction on the amount of money a person
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign, necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached.").
102. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 982, 1029 (2011)
(proposing that assembly, petition, and association are at least as central to the process of self-
governance as free speech and that the Supreme Court's tendency to treat them as subordinate is
wrong).
103. See id.
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geographically disconnected outsiders can assert a disproportionate
influence by theoretically limitless expenditures. 10
Money is not constrained by geography or personhood. Private
organizations 1o5 or state officials may target a community for policy
change, and if left unchecked, their influence can quickly overwhelm the
grassroots minority clusters that progressive federalism romanticizes.
Their mission is buoyed by the perceived value in advocacy, because an
actor's belief that their actions will lead to a greater social good breeds
an increased willingness to exert voice.10 6 If this principle applies to
money as voice, it fosters evangelization of particular policies through
injection of capital.
Members of these private groups can remain anonymous,10 elimi-
nating reputational cost from the equation. This frees them from public
accountability for how they exert pressure and allows the unchecked and
willful proliferation of misinformation.10 They enjoy a further advan-
tage in that they are unhindered in their mobility or dependence on
a community. The nature of their "speech" means that, in terms of
resources, their political money maintains a competitive advantage in the
arena of voice.
Monied advocates can attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of a
community through repetition of their message. These organizations are
particularly efficient in the art of shifting public opinion, so a deluge of
104. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy warned of a "chilling effect" on free speech if IE's
had limitations to how much money they could raise. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 320, 350
(2010) ("Limits on independent expenditures, such as §441b, have a chilling effect extending well
beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The anticorruption
interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.").
105. Through several decisions, the Supreme Court curbed limits on contributions to so-called
"Independent Expenditure" political action committees, ruling that free speech (for corporations,
organizations, and individuals) outweighed the governmental interest of stemming pay for play
corruption. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003) (defining political action committees
as "separate segregated funds . . . for election-related contributions and expenditures"), overruled
on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
106. Hirschman, supra note 22, at 434 ("[D]eterioration in the taste of a firm's food product
will give rise to exit; but the presence of a health hazard will lead to voice.").
107. See Buckley v. Valeo, 1 U.S. 42 (1976) (drawing a distinction between express advocacy
for a particular candidate and issue advocacy, which was supposedly sufficiently attenuated from
actual candidates to prevent direct corruption). For a primer on campaign-finance law and PAC
corruption, see Richard Hansen, Of Super PACs and Corruption, POLrrIco (Mar. 22, 2012), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74336.html. For more on how the Court has misjudged the
possibility of corruption, see Esther Houseman, Note, Citizens United v. FEC: Departure From
Precedent Opens the Gate to "Phantom" Political Speakers, 70 MD. L. REv. ENDNOTES 50
(2011).
108. This is especially true as economies of scale have continued to decimate accurate and
legitimate local news coverage. See Tim Worstall, Not the Solution to the Newspaper Industry
Going Bankrupt, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/09/25/
not-the-solution-to-the-newspaper-industry-going-bankrupt/.
2014] 869
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cash can cripple the voices of community activists and dissenters.o 9
They can bombard the airwaves and exploit an electorate in ways that
make them seem dominant. This in turn can distort the marketplace for
truth by biasing public opinion"o and destroying the effectiveness for
grassroots dissent before it congeals into something viable. This concern
extends to contributions made on behalf of candidates. While at the
national level, competing monied voices might fight to a draw, the influ-
ence of monied minorities grows stronger the further down one looks.
According to Professor David Parker:
Voters have far less information at these local elections. There's a lot
less money that's being spent on these elections already, so if you
have a big gorilla come into town and drop a lot of cash-lets say
$100,000, $200,000 in that race-I think the effect there could be
much more tremendous than at the federal level." 1
The relative cost of voice in administrative dissention, free expression,
or even voting simply cannot compete with the fiscal intrusion. Using
money, private groups can seek to sway opinions of the polity, and the
actions of the elected." 12 But money from outside groups and minority
voices are not the only sources that can endanger participatory voice.
Analogous fiscal interference can come from inside the government and
do as much damage to the expression of voice as money from non-gov-
ernment groups.
C. Money Listens
Money from within the government can compete with participatory
forms of voice in ways that overwhelm or silence minority dissent.
Heather Gerken describes the decision-making process for dissenting
communities as independent and pragmatic: "They can pass a law the
109. Today's modem public relations campaign is a science where tested polling finds the right
phrases where repetition will create credibility and drown out the established minority-positions
that have flourished at the local level. See Hana Kim, Repetition Effect of Positive and Negative
Political Advertising with the Presence or Absence of Disclaimer: Recall, Attitude, and Voting
Intention, UNIv. OF GEORGIA (2005), available at http://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/
handle/10724/8407/kimhana_200508_ma.pdf; see also NAOMI ORESKEs & ERIK M. CONWAY,
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT (2011) (describing methods used for minority voices from the tobacco and
energy lobby to change the mind of the public).
110. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev.
964, 974-78 (1978) ("Emotional or "irrational" appeals have great [impact].. . the marketplace of
ideas appears improperly bias in favor of presently dominant groups.").
I 11. Frontline, supra note 12.
112. Lobbyists and major donors can exert pressures in how policy is implemented by
threatening to finance a competitor in the next election. See Senator Al Franken, If You Ever
Wonder Whether We Really Need Public Financing of Elections in this Country, HUFFINGTON
PosT (Jun. 4, 2007), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-franken/if-you-ever-wonder-whethe_b_
50344.html (discussing the disproportionate amount of time politicians spend raising money rather
than legislating).
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federal government refused to pass, as did California in enforcing pollu-
tion mandates. Or they can refuse to implement law the federal govern-
ment has passed, as states did with environmental enforcement
mandates.""' But the power of the purse can distort this simplicity. It is
a trump card, carrot, and stick all at once.
Competitive grant programs sponsored by the federal government
encourage state administrators to play politics with money, often at the
expense of dissenters.114 On the national stage, states have been known
to try using federal grants to lure businesses away from neighboring
states.' 15 Closer to home, state politicians with "majority views" can
strategize on the best ways to boost their chances of re-election by
accepting or rejecting funds. Local administrators below who depend on
these funds become more loyal to their superiors, trying their best not to
get cut out of the loop. Governments can leverage these funds to exert a
disproportionate voice on policy implementation at a very local level,
firing or removing disloyal administrators from meaningful positions in
the process.
When federal money is rejected,"' there is little recourse for
minority communities. Rejection of funding usually disproportionately
affects the dissenting or disadvantaged minority because it represents a
means for the majority in power to maintain influence. On the other
hand, if the money is accepted, the money is channeled to communities
who have been the most loyal allies to the administration and withheld
from those who have been difficult-even in an emergency situation.'" 7
Once again, the disruptive voice of the non-monied dissenter can do
little to get a piece of the action and is silenced by the competitive
advantage of money. Dissenting voices are stuck in a catch-22, held hos-
tage to loyalty due to fiscal dependence, and communities that are more
dependent on funds inherently have less of a sway. But in situations
where minority-rule is achieved and there is substantial autonomy, what
happens when the community falls on hard times?
113. Gerken, supra note 6, at 65-66.
114. Dyson, supra note 11.
115. Conor Dougherty, Are Incentives Smart Business or a Race to the Bottom?, WALL ST.
J. (July 13, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/06/13/are-incentives-smart-business-or-
race-to-the-bottom/ (detailing National Cash Register Company's plan to move from Ohio to
Atlanta for tax breaks, using stimulus money to finance their move and new headquarters).
116. Timothy Williams, Florida's Governor Rejects High-Speed Rail Line, Fearing Cost to
Taxpayers, N.Y. TiMEs (Feb. 17, 2011), at A20; Gary Stein, Committee Chair May Stonewall
Medicaid Expansion Bills Early in FL, HUFFINGTON PosT (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/gary-stein/committee-chairs-medicaid-florida_b_4959259.html.
117. Rosalind S. Helderman, Mayor of Hoboken, N.J.: Christie Aides Tied Sandy Fund
Requests to Support for Project, WASHINGTON PosT (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/hoboken-mayor-christie-aides-tied-sandy-fund-requests-to-support-for-project/2014/
01/18/d6f63e86-805d-11 e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84-story.html.
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D. Money Destroys: A Hostile Takeover in the Spartan State
The last thing you want to do when you are an Emergency Manager
is to have democratic participation in the process of governance.
-Michael Stampfler, Former Emergency Manager, Pontiac,
Michigan"1 '
A major hole in the theory of progressive federalism is the lack of
protection for minority-run communities from hostile takeovers for eco-
nomic gain. Michael Stampfler gave a refreshingly candid response
when asked how much effect voices in the community had on the poli-
cymaking process under the state receivership law.119 State receivership
allows the state government to intervene directly in the municipality's
affairs with varying degrees of severity.12 0 While dozens of municipali-
ties have come in and out of receivership since the 1970s,12 the newest
iteration of this type of law gives unprecedented discretion to governors
and their appointed agents.
A disconcerting pattern has emerged in the execution of these poli-
cies. Communities deemed eligible for this sort of hostile takeover are
generally under minority rule, politically out of step with the governor,
and lack the economic power at the state level to defend themselves.'2 2
The plenary powers 2 3 of the appointee go far beyond the local demo-
cratically elected officials they replace: "I always took it that the Emer-
gency Manager could do whatever [he] wanted to get the numbers
right."1 24 These powers extend to the ability to sever contracts, sever
existing collective bargaining agreements, contract out public services,
sell public assets, and cancel local programs.12 5 In short, the Emergency
Manager is empowered to remove citizens from having an administra-
118. Michael Stampfler was one of several persons appointed to an Emergency Manager
position when the state of Michigan used the recession of 2008 to grant unprecedented emergency
powers through state receiverships to the executive branch. Telephone Interview with Michael L.
Stampfler, Former Emergency Manager of Pontiac, Michigan (Feb. 6, 2013).
119. Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 141.1501-31 (2011) (repealed by state referendum in 2012). While the law has since been
repealed by referendum, the state legislature has quickly passed an alternative with only a slightly
smaller changes, this time attached to a non-severable appropriations bill so it cannot be repealed.
See Laura Clawson, Michigan House Passes New Version of Emergency Manager Law Repealed
by Voters, DAILY Kos (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/12/13/1169517/-
Michigan-House-passes-new-version-of-emergency-law-repealed-by-voters.
120. See David R. Berman, Takeovers of Local Governments: An Overview and Evaluation of
State Policies, 25 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 55, 57-64 (1995).
121. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State
Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 584 (2011).
122. Id. at 590.
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4) (2011) (subsequently overturned by popular refer-
endum in 2012); Anderson, supra note 121, at 580.
124. Stampfler, supra note 118.
125. See Anderson, supra note 121, at 580.
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tive stake in governance and handpick private corporations to profit in
their place.
The majority that governs the state has the ability to use its voice
and execute an economic "changing of the guard" in communities domi-
nated by persons with dissenting views. They do so by empowering the
governor to delegate a manager, who conducts a fire sale of the local
assets and contracts without consequences, cloaked in a statute of immu-
nity.12 6 The plenary powers of the position mean that dissenting admin-
istrators or unions that otherwise might try to push back on the
autocratic rule through disloyalty could quickly find themselves unem-
ployed or losing their pension as punitive repercussions. A manager's
immunity means that a jury from the community will never get a chance
to push back on perceived abuses.
After eliminating self-determination, the state does not provide any
direct economic relief' 27 or structure for long-term recovery. The usual
state of affairs involves selling the city assets off piece-by-piece: "They
abrogate the civic structure of the community for a period of years then
return it virtually dismantled for the community to attempt to somehow
make a go of it."1 28 The perverted motivation behind the law places
blame for municipal economic issues almost solely on the municipality's
elected representatives,129 reasoning that if the state can take the city out
of the way, its strong-handed autocrat will garner more efficiency from
the same budgetary resources. 130
This tool allows governments and private organizations to scape-
goat and exploit a community for monetary gain. Economically, what
makes minority-rule valuable for growth is a feedback loop where
voices holding minority views empower leaders, who pass the power of
voice back to their community in the form of contracts and opportunities
for public employment. Progressive federalism agrees that economic
progress in African-American communities has turned on business set-
asides, affirmative action, and government employment.' 3 1 But it does
126. It should also be noted that the Emergency statutorily allowed immunity from suit for his
actions in office. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4) (2011).
127. Anderson, supra note 121, at 588-89.
128. Michael Stamplfer, an experienced town manager, continues to speak out about particular
failures of emergency manager laws. Jason Alley, Former Emergency Financial Manager Will
Speak in Wyandotte; Says Emergency Manager Law 'Is Failing', WYANDOTTE PATCH (Apr.
24, 2012), http://wyandotte.patch.com/articles/former-emergency-financial-manager-will-speak-
in-wyandotte-says-emergency-manager-law-is-failing.
129. See Anderson, supra note 121, at 582.
130. Id. at 606 ("Centralization of power by the state on these terms does not ameliorate
structural causes of financial distress, like concentrated poverty, the loss of middle-class jobs
across a region, or local borders that fragment a single metropolitan area into socioeconomically
segregated cities."); see id. at 582.
131. Gerken, supra note 5, at 41.
8732014]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
not contemplate how economic voices and pressures can lead the major-
ity to scapegoat, initiate a hostile takeover of, and loot the systems
where minorities rule. The broadness and completeness with which it
removes minority voices from participation resembles something bor-
dering on imperialism. If we imagine money as voice, the logic would
go something like this: you cannot be trusted with the voice you have
amassed, so we will appoint a guardian to distribute it until you start
over.
Political pressures on the Emergency Manager from the outside are
unsurprisingly described as "enormous."1 32 The overtly political nature
of these appointments can be inferred from the fact that Emergency
Managers like Michael Stampfler are often removed from duty when the
gubernatorial responsibilities change hands.133 Appointment serves to
centralize power all the way up to the state level.' 34 In Michigan, phone
calls from the Deputy State Treasurer, whose boss is appointed by the
Governor, are not uncommon to make powerful "suggestions" on how
the Emergency Manager should do his job. 35 And sometimes, adding
insult to financial injury, persons are appointed with no management
experience at all.136
The suspension of meaningful endogenous democratic participation
means residents' only remaining outlet for voice is to complain to an
unsympathetic governor and legislature or take their battle to the courts.
But the latter option is complicated further by financial issues because
provisions in these laws often force the municipality to pay all legal
defense fees out of their budget, further exacerbating the problem that
led to state receivership in the first place. 3 7
Essentially, this process purports to serve the fiscal needs of the
state and neighboring "majority" towns, but the selection is arbitrary,
and when money is at stake, dissenting populations are the ones who
lose. Michigan's law is a tragic silencing of minority participation where
outside economic interests undermine the power of voice. The assump-
tion that non-minority Emergency Managers can perform better on the
job than local elected officials lacks a rational explanation. What follows
are short term political pressures to post good numbers, which in prac-
132. Stampfler, supra note 118.
133. See id.
134. Anderson, supra note 121, at 602.
135. Stampfler, supra note 118.
136. See Shaun Byron, Three Financial Managers Later, Is Pontiac Better off Today?,
OAKLAND PRESS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.conwaymackenzie.com/documents/2-8-12_Oakland
PressPontiac.pdf (indicating rampant political changes in personnel in Pontiac, Michigan under
the Emergency Manager Law).
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1515(4) (2011).
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tice lead to sales of assets that cripple the municipality in the long term.
After all, "you don't want the town to go bankrupt, so you try to prop it
up however you can so the Emergency Manager can say everything is
okay,"' and the governor can take credit for putting a Band-Aid on
localities that are a "net drain," fiscally speaking, on the state.
But there are winners in this situation. And where there are win-
ners, there is an incentive to lobby for government receivership. Private
corporations stand to gain enormously if they have been shut out of the
bidding process by a minority-rule community for a number of years.
Those who secure private contracts from the Emergency Manager get to
"enter" the community as economic players, taking ownership without
the hassle of dissenters in administrative roles. This kind of "economic
raiding" forcibly inserts new players into "servant positions" of the pol-
ity through private contracts, and the animosity it leaves behind may
never fade. One must wonder to what degree the lobbyists pressure the
state to intervene, and if in turn, the governor pressures the Emergency
Manager to use his power to cancel municipal contracts, negotiating new
long-term ones that reward campaign donors and political allies for their
loyalty. In this battle between money and organic voice, there is no
question which side's relative strength prevails.
Michael Stampfler summed it up best: a private corporation with
the right financial incentives can rip off a town just as easily as public
unions. When we measure the benefits of receivership to the community,
there are usually none.' 39 But the ease with which money conquers other
forms of participatory voice in this case study shows us that when it
comes to progressive federalism, there is room to improve the model.
IV. EXTENDING PROGRESSIVE FEDERALISM:
FEDERALISM OF THE FUTURE?
Progressive federalism deserves praise for its bold willingness to
collapse the formalist strictures of sovereignty. In our highly connected
information age, 140 the relevance of borders continues to fade away in
favor of participation, collaboration, and discussion. Surveys of Ameri-
can Millennials have revealed that the generation's increased levels of
diversity are accompanied by an ebbing of sympathies for nationalist
138. Stampfler, supra note 118.
139. "You go through all the motions, but most of the time it can't be fixed." Id.
140. Business theorist Peter Drucker theorized that the effect of computers and the Internet
would be on the same scale as the railroad or printing press when it came to how we conduct
business. Peter F. Drucker, Beyond the Information Revolution, THE ATLANTIc (Oct. 1999), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/10/beyond-the-information-revolution/304658/.
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policies.14 ' In the context of globalism, there may be a way to push
federalism all the way up' 42 by softening the formalist embrace of inter-
national sovereignty to empower dissenters in the global citizenry.' 4 3
Exit is already a real choice for residents of neighboring countries with
open borders who can "vote with their feet." But how can dissenters use
voice on a global scale once we cast rigid national identities aside?
Federalism of the future could go even further, breaking down the
connection between voices and geography entirely. Those who lack
financial means should not be bound by physical proximity and can turn
to cyberspace to find collaborators who share dissenting views. In the
new public square online, search costs in the market of ideas are greatly
minimized, embracing and promoting free speech across international
borders. Money's purchasing power generally cannot overshadow other
organic forms of free speech in cyberspace, and the consumer is far less
vulnerable to persuasion through bombardment and repetition-even the
most sophisticated advertising campaign cannot replicate the value and
voice of virality. Our democratic participation through the Internet is
paradoxical, serving three roles at once: 1) an external tool for private
ordering, 2) an integrated channel within our existing democratic struc-
ture, and perhaps 3) a revolutionary and independent transnational sys-
tem1" allowing global participation in decision-making by anyone with
access.
At the time of this writing, the United States is in the process of
taking a monumental step towards empowering new transnational voices
in democracy as it transfers its overseer role on the Internet to an inter-
national body by 2015.145 Since the Internet's conception, the United
States has been responsible for assigning and administering numerical
addresses that form the basis for .com, .net, .gov, and other shortcuts that
users commonly utilize online. While it is easy to take the stability of
the web for granted, this could be a watershed moment towards decen-
141. Scott Keeter and Paul Taylor, The Millennials, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.pewresearch.org/2009/12/10/the-millennials/.
142. See Somin, supra note 19, at 29 (discussing federalism all the way up in the context of
exit).
143. Judith Resnik has already written about communities ratifying and implementing treaties
without the backing the national government. See Judith Resnik, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local
Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS),
50 Ariz. L. Rev. 709 (2008) (highlighting bottom-up adoption of an international treaty despite
national abstention).
144. The inventor of the Internet is actively calling for an Internet Bill of Rights. Klint Finley,
Inventor of Web is Right: We Need an Internet Bill of Rights, WIRED (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.
wired.com/wiredenterprise/2014/03/web25/.
145. Edward Wyatt, U.S. to Cede Its Oversight of Addresses on Internet, N.Y. Tims (Mar. 15,
2014), at Bl.
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tralization and cooperation.146
A. New Forms of Voice
The lack of natural sovereign borders in cyberspace ensures that it
will remain a soapbox where speech and ideas are exchanged, and where
disloyal administrators can take action to spark international debate.
Global governance in the administration of the Internet is unlikely to be
a repeat of the brokenness we see in the United Nations Security Council
because the users all have a relatively equal voice in the generation of
content. However, to maintain this equality and the efficacy of the
medium, the preservation of net neutrality is paramount.14 7 This princi-
ple is analogous to breaking down sovereignty in its effect-it disburses
the concentration of power and gives minority views a chance to com-
pete in persuading the majority. It protects the relative costs of speech
while ensuring that even users with dissenting content on the fringe are
afforded a voice that can be accessed for the same price as mainstream
content.
Having grown up "online," Millennials hold a normative demand
for freedom of information that sees any attempt to regulate the Internet
as a direct affront to their livelihood.14 8 Federalism of the future can
inherit the muscular form of voice described in progressive federalism,
but administrators pushing back on the normative center do so with even
bigger international implications. Access to information by the public
can multiply the impact of disloyalty in the context of administration on
a far greater scale.
Two huge expressions of disloyalty have profoundly affected and
catalyzed international discourse in recent years. Pfc. Bradley Manning
used his administrative role in the military to publicly release documents
and spark a debate, and while this resulted in accusations of treason and
ultimate conviction of lesser charges,' 49 it led to serious discussion
146. However, we must not rule out the possibility that censor-states like China and Russia
attempt to grab influence and reshape the global Internet in their own image.
147. Net neutrality guarantees free speech on the Internet by leveling the playing field as a
public good with a relatively flat rate. Telecom giants are attempting to alter the system to exert
"tiered" control over the speed and access different classes of users get in accessing sites. See
Jason D. O'Grady, Apple in Talks with Comcast for Streaming TV, RIP Net Neutrality? ZDNET
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/apple-in-talks-with-comcast-for-streaming-tv-rip-net-
neutrality-7000027606/.
148. Robbie Fordyce, Snowden and Berners-Lee's Campaign for an Open Internet, THE
CONVERSATION (Mar. 13, 2014), http://theconversation.com/snowden-and-bemers-lees-campaign-
for-an-open-internet-24329.
149. Julie Tate, Judge Sentences Bradley Manning to 35 Years, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 21,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-man
ning-today/2013/08/20/85beel 84-09d0- l e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd-story.htm.
2014] 877
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
about military policy changes that were not without effect."o Similarly,
Edward Snowden's disloyalty as an administrator for a government con-
tractor launched a debate over the National Security Agency's eaves-
dropping that had not before made its way into the public square in a
serious way. Some international outlets have credited his leaks with gen-
erating the international pressure responsible for the United States ced-
ing control over the Internet."' Moreover, the discussion has revealed a
unique generational gap in polling, where 18-29 year olds overwhelm-
ingly feel Snowden has served the public interest, and persons over fifty
overwhelmingly believe his actions have been harmful.15 2 This divide in
popular opinion originates from interactions in cyberspace and tran-
scends geography. There is no reason to believe that the new demand for
openness and debate does not also transcend international boundaries.
The digital medium has the potential to prompt dissenters worldwide to
put pressure on governments for transparency and openness, leveling the
playing field and allowing relatively equal participants to play a role in
decision-making.
By eliminating geography from the construction of voice in poli-
cymaking, new organic communities that in the past would have been
isolated from one another can come together online and build consensus
to turn minority opinions into normative goals. Communities online pro-
vide new opportunities for voice through social media and interactive
platforms to organize in both the physical and digital world. Frustrated
dissenters can coalesce to strengthen their message or beliefs. Much of
Arab Spring was coordinated through social media,1 53 but the effect has
extended to other identifiable organizations "born" in cyberspace,
maturing to assemble in the physical world to fight perceived social
150. Matt Sledge, Bradley Manning Uncovered U.S. Torture, Abuse, Soldiers Laughing As
They Killed Innocent Civilians, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/08/21/bradley-manning-leaks_n_3788126.html; but see Bradley Manning Leak Has
Had Chilling Effect on US Foreign Policy, Court Hears, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2013), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/21/bradley-manning-leaks-n_3788126.html.
151. Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A's Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2014), at Al (highlighting the President's call for a change in policy for a program
that was revealed by the Edward Snowden leaks); Tim Walker, Edward Snowden: NSA
Whistleblower's Leaks Prompt US to Make Control of Internet Truly Worldwide, THE INDE-
PENDENT (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uklife-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/ed
ward-snowden-nsa-whistleblowers-leaks-prompt-us-to-make-control-of-internet-truly-worldwide-
9200578.html.
152. Drew Desilver, Most Young Americans Say Snowden Has Served the Public Interest, PEw
RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/22/most-
young-americans-say-snowden-has-served-the-public-interest/.
153. Saleem Kassim, Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media,
POLICYMIC (July 3, 2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/10642/twitter-revolution-how-the-
arab-spring-was-helped-by-social-media.
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injustice perpetuated by monied interest groups.' 5 4 This type of energy
on the "periphery" might be just what it takes to stem the crushing tide
of monied-voices. But while one clear strength of the social network is
the ability for any individual to take to a global platform to attract like-
minded citizens, the Internet may provide even more disruptive modes
of exit that could be embraced to safeguard dissenting communities.
B. New Forms of Exit
While the invention of the Internet still exists in relative infancy, it
already has numerous applications in assisting dissatisfied citizens with
escaping poor public policy. First, the ease in accessing information
means that exit through relocation does not carry as much risk as in the
past. One can easily search for a new home, a new job, or for the truly
exasperated citizen, a new country, with just a few keystrokes. Similarly,
persons dissatisfied with the performance of government authorities can
use the Internet to cheaply find private institutions like schools or hospi-
tals. In theory, the diligent dissenter could most effectively shop around
for a new hometown by comparing the political actors and sets of laws
the location provides.
More directly, the inexpensive ability to exit continues to funda-
mentally reshape commerce. Shoppers can connect with businesses in
peer-to-peer marketplaces, from Amazon and Craigslist to Etsy, in order
to avoid sales taxes and access greater selections of products from across
the globe at more competitive prices. Less legitimate forms of exit
involve piracy, as peer-to-peer networks have also sprung up as avenues
for dissenters to escape traditional copyright regimes. However, these
methods of circumventing public policy, while usually effective, remain
subject to government intervention."' Banks may attach assets upon
government directive. Payment processors like Paypal can be pressured
to stop receiving payment on behalf of questionable websites in the
same way.' 56 Abroad, dictators can nationalize businesses and seize the
assets of political enemies with little consequence.
154. Members of the group Anonymous have been referred to as "Internet vigilantes" in their
willingness to target and harass individuals ranging from Neo-Nazi's to pedophiles. Displeasure
over the Church of Scientology's active copyright enforcement of an indoctrination video
featuring Tom Cruise led to relatively large protests by Anonymous members across the globe.
The video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFBZ uAbxSO. See William Sager,
Anonymous, Lulzsec, 4Chan & Tom Cruise's Scientology, MEDIUM.COM (Apr. 20, 2013), https://
medium.com/the-underbelly-of-the-web/le240ac70a21.
155. This intervention may be legitimate, like in the case of piracy, or illegitimate, like in the
case of targeting political enemies.
156. PayPal Statement Regarding Wikileaks, PAYPAL BLOG (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.the
paypalblog.com/2010/12/paypal-statement-regarding-wikileaks/ (halting payments to Wikileaks
for "illegal activity").
2014]1 879
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A new application of peer-to-peer networking and data storage has
the potential to revolutionize exit and private ordering options to safe-
guard dissenting groups. Such a technique would have been helpful in
Pontiac, Michigan in making outsider access to the town's contracts and
banking impossible. Referred to as the "block chain," this private order-
ing system of record-keeping technology allows individuals, groups, and
communities of dissenters to operate outside of the existing state-sanc-
tioned financial and legal systems in order to avoid monetary interfer-
ence and maintain autonomy.' While the public is most familiar with
its prototype form as Bitcoin,158 the real allure of the protocol is the
ability to create self-executing "smart-contracts"15 9 that exist on the
peer-to-peer network and cannot be reversed without the digital signa-
tures of multiple parties. Public communities could turn this private sys-
tem into their own by setting up accounts using mathematics to
safeguard their assets from intrusions by the authorities above. In the
framework of a minority-ruled community, this would ensure that pen-
sions for workers cannot be withdrawn without express approval from
the beneficiary, the chain of title for publically owned land remained
secure from autocratic alienation, and the community's bank funds
would be safe from a hostile takeover. While this method of "commu-
nity exit" may seem like science fiction today, it may only be decades
away. This nearly costless revitalization of exit has the potential to revo-
lutionize how we think about minority governance through the demo-
cratic embrace of self-executing contracts.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to critique and expand upon an emerging theory of
flexible federalism that pushes power all the way down to the citizen in
its role as an administrator where both the vertical and horizontal power
struggle are imperative for democracy. The commoditization of speech
through its doctrinal equivalence with money serves to discount other
methods of voice feedback essential to a theory of progressive federal-
ism. As a result, monied interests can overwhelm the more organic and
participatory forms of speech through its lower comparative cost. This
can lead to the furtherance of inequality. For this reason, I have tried to
highlight technology's critical role in preserving meaningful participa-
157. Fundamentally, the peer-to-peer network contains several thousand peers that share and
update identical copies of a record-keeping book.
158. SATOSHI NAKAMOTo, BrrcoIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM, available at
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
159. See ETHEREUM WHITE PAPER: NEXT-GENERATION SMART CONTRACT AND DECENTRAL-
IZED APPLICATION PLATFORM, available at https://github.comlethereum/wikilwiki/%5BEnglish%
5D-White-Paper.
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tion for those dissatisfied with authorities in governance and how it can
level the playing field. Like dissents in the law, minority views are often
vindicated by the future and trigger a new way of thinking. We should
value these views for the possibility of future innovation, so it is crucial
that their voices are not overwhelmed. This is important because, in the
democratic process when exit options are limited, voice is often the only
tool dissenters have.
